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The demands of American society to preserve certain environments, because 
they provide aesthetic appreciation, has been increasingly referred as supportive 
evidence by the courts to sustain aesthetic regulations in the United States. 
However, in spite of the increasing collective demands of people for aesthetic 
preservation, and in spite of the increasing amount of such regulations, the courts 
still have problems to justify the validity of preservation oriented aesthetic 
regulations, i.e., the courts are still troubled in providing a justification that these 
regulations are valid and legitimate forms of governmental control over private 
property for public purposes. Although the U. S. Supreme Court and the 
majority of the courts of States have recognized a broadened definition of public 
purpose which states that even the aesthetic purposes alone can be the basis of 
police power use, the courts are still struggling with finding a sound definition 
of aesthetics. In many court cases, even if the aesthetic purpose alone is accepted 
as the sufficient basis for the enforcement of a regulation, the general language 
used in justifications still include references to secondary non-aesthetic reasons, 
such as protecting the property values (in especially design review cases), main-
taining the tourists' interests (in especially historical preservation cases), or 
protecting public safety (in especially billboard cases) (Linder 1990, Rowlett 
1981, Williams 1977). 
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Many design scholars, regulators and judges deal with the question of defining 
aesthetic concerns. It is crucial for the courts to understand and scrutinize the 
motives behind the collective demands to preserve, for example, certain 
landmarks, or to protect the visual character of a neighborhood, or a scenic vista 
or to reserve an untouched natural area. Where do these collective interests or 
sentiments come from and what do they really want in terms of planning and 
design? Is it really because of the financial interests that people of New Orleans 
want to keep French Quarter's architectural character? Is it because of safety 
issues that many communities do not want to see billboards around the highways? 
A sound person's answer would be: 'These concerns are important but not so 
important to enforce historic preservation or billboard regulations. The real 
reasons are different and probably closely related with aesthetic concerns .. . ' 
Courts recognize and actually adapt this kind of reasoning but still are puzzled 
with the problem of defining these concerns. Why don't people like the 
billboards? Is it because they think they are not picturesque? If so, are there any 
other objects which are not picturesque, so that we can regulate them too? What 
is to be picturesque? To what degree people do not like them? In other words, 
are there some other people who like them? If yes, why do they like them? That 
is to say, on what aesthetic grounds do they appreciate them? Can there be a 
special kind of billboard design that most of the people like, or at least not be 
offended (so that we can require the use of that kind)? One can add tens of similar 
questions to these. These questions are questions with vital importance for the 
courts. Plausible answers can help the courts to test the constitutionality of regula-
tions. Plausible answers are indeed necessary to be able to define government's 
interest in regulating the architectural style in a neighborhood and to address the 
freedom of speech issue. The answers are important to be able to balance the 
condemned private property and protected public interest. Unless some answers are 
provided, even though they recognize the validity of aesthetic purposes, the courts 
will continue to be puzzled and look for secondary non-aesthetic justifications to 
test the constitutionality of aesthetic regulations and to defend their validity. 
Although the above listed questions seem hard to answer because of their 
seemingly subjective and vague character, they are by no means untouched and 
unstudied questions. Different aesthetic theories have different answers. Some 
of them are quite reasonable and have been used in courts. The problem is that, 
most of the time, their usage in courts is mixed with non-aesthetic justifications, 
and therefore, they fail to provide a comprehensive understanding of the collec-
tive aesthetic sentiments. Furthermore, the analytical studies comparing dif-
ferent aesthetic approaches and explanations, in terms of their ability to 
scrutinize the aesthetic collective attitudes, are few in number and this line of 
study has not yet attracted the attention it deserves, 
This paper is an attempt to provide a framework to explore the interrelations 
between aesthetic judgments and aesthetic regulations and to review and com-
pare different aesthetic approaches that courts generally refer to in the context 
of legal aesthetics in the United States. 
The next section of the paper provides a quick general historical background of 
aesthetic regulations in the United States. This review will point out that during 
the history of aesthetic regulations the number of the regulations has increased, 
the collective will to preserve certain environments has grown, and the courts' 
definition of public welfare has been broadened. The following section will 
provide a framework to explore the interrelations between aesthetic judgments 
and legitimation of aesthetic regulations. The argument will be that it- is not fair 
to consider the aesthetic regulations as restitutionary regulations where the 
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pecuniary compensation is aimed. The aesthetic regulations are motivated by 
some collective sentiments or emotions, and therefore, they can be validated only 
by a plausible explanation of the motives of mentioned collective emotions. In 
this sense, the aesthetic judgments used in normative aesthetic theories can be 
important sources for legal legitimation of aesthetic theories. 
The next section of the paper will explore and compare four different aesthetic 
approaches and associated judgments. The historical backgrounds of these ap-
proaches will also be provided. These approaches are (a) subjective approach, 
(b) objective approach which sees nature as an object of beauty, (c) the objective 
approach which sees the experience in nature as uplifting, educating and aes-
thetically pleasing, and finally (d) the inter-subjective approach which defines 
the aesthetic experience referring to the symbolic meanings and values attached 
to the environment. The last section will conclude with the argument that the 
inter-subjective approach is the most promising one to provide a general 
framework to explore the aesthetic demands in many different cases. This 
approach is particularly suitable for courts in their efforts to test the con-
stitutionality of aesthetic regulations and to justify their validity. 
A BRIEF HISTORY OF AESTHETIC REGULATIONS IN THE UNITED 
STATES 
The Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co. (1926) is a well known landmark case 
whereby the U. S. Supreme Court legitimized the use of police power in the 
zoning of private land by local governments for public health, safety, welfare and 
morals. Other than legitimizing the use of police power for zoning, the Euclid 
case recognized the concept of'welfare'as a valid public purpose (Rowlett, 1981). 
Before Euclid the public health and safety was the only valid basis to regulate 
private property. Public safety and health is a pretty straightforward purpose in 
terms of its accountability and its undeniable necessity. Public welfare, on the 
other hand, is a broader concept which has a potential to be interpreted to include 
many other purposes including the aesthetic ones. However, this broader inter-
pretation of the term to include aesthetic purposes came into the scene only 28 
years after Euclid. In his famous statement at the U. S. Supreme Court case 
Berman v. Parker (1954), Justice Douglas stated: 
The concept of public welfare is broad and inclusive... The values it 
represents are spiritual as well as physical, aesthetic as well as 
monetary. It is within the power of the legislature to determine that 
the community should be beautiful as well as healthy, spacious as well 
as clean, well-balanced as well as carefully patrolled (348 U. S. 26, 
1954). 
Although Berman was an 'eminent domain* case, it influenced many zoning cases 
with its broad definition of public welfare (Rowlett, 1981). This definition 
removed from the shoulders of the court the necessity to find fictive legal 
justifications for aesthetic regulations, i.e., using finance or safety related jus-
tifications to control billboards where the original intent behind the regulations 
is removing or preventing the visual disturbance, and provided the opportunity 
to use aesthetic purposes alone as the valid governmental interest to use the 
police powerortheargument of'eminent domain'(Karp, 1990; Pearlman, 1988). 
In another important case, Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City, 
U. S. Supreme Court recognized New York City's Landmark Commission's 
concerns as valid public interest to use police power for 'taking' purposes. The 
court stated that: 
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. . . state and cities may enact land use restrictions or controls to 
enhance the quality of life by preserving the character and desirable 
aesthetic features of a city (438 U. S. 129,1975). 
This case is significant also, because it has legitimated the cultural stability 
oriented preservation purposes as opposed to aesthetic concerns in Berman 
which favored an 'Urban Renewal' development. 
After Berman, the attitudes of State Courts towards aesthetic regulations have also 
changed. Many state courts have followed the Supreme Court's interpretation of 
public welfare and treated aesthetics as a valid basis for regulation. Karp (1990) 
suggests that the reasons are various. Some states, like Hawaii, Pennsylvania, and 
Montana, have constitutional provisions for using aesthetic basis alone. Others use 
aesthetic purposes depending on their state statutes, such as Minnesota's Highway 
Beautification Act and Washington's Shoreline Management Act (Smardon and 
Karp, 1993). Pearlman (1988) states that eighteen states have accepted regulations 
on the aesthetic basis alone, nine states prohibit regulations based on aesthetic 
purposes alone, and fourteen states have not decided the issue, as of 1988. In 1980, 
there were sixteen states with accepted regulations on aesthetic basis alone, and nine 
states which prohibited aesthetic basis (Bufford 1980). 
One explanation of this change in the history of land use regulations is that as 
the society establishes its settlements and as the settlements reach to a mature 
phase, the concerns of its citizens for their surroundings shift from vital concerns 
like safety and health towards more subtle ones. In 1913, the first comprehensive 
bulk control regulations appeared in New York, where health was a serious 
problem in the very high density city barracks (Gerckens, 1988). Similarly, the 
first subdivision regulations appeared to control the design and construction 
standards with the primary concerns of public health and safety (Ducker, 1988). 
As the vital problems of these settlements were resolved, new concerns emerged. 
These new concerns were mostly about the character of communities or about 
the better configurations of different uses based on essential assumption of 
incompatibility of uses in zoning. 
This explanation makes sense, but it is actually too general to grasp certain 
details. It is especially weak in explaining increasing concerns guiding the regula-
tions oriented to nature preservation, i.e., the scenic beauty and visual resource 
management regulations. 
Another argument explaining the increase in aesthetic regulations is that proces-
ses, such as rapid suburbanization (the two big phases being the 1920's and 
postwar growth of 1950*s through 1960's), increasing population in cities and 
urban sprawl, and appearances of unprecedented environmental problems, e.g. 
'dust bowl' of Great Plains in 1930s, have created a movement from individualism 
toward more collectivism. 
More and more collective concerns appeared, and hence, people started to accept 
the necessity of extended regulations over private property. Along with its 
emphasis on people's increasing sensitivity for environmental issues, the argu-
ment also suggests that both the increase in quantity and the expansion in 
purpose of regulations go parallel with the empowering cultural and collective 
values as opposed to increasing individuality. 
Consequently, mechanisms such as billboard controls, scenic beauty regulations, 
and historic preservation have grown after the 1950s, and with the passage of 
National Environmental Policy Act (1969), the aesthetic impacts of any major 
federal project have been an issue of consideration. 
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As the number of regulations has increased, the language used in the courts has 
also changed and concepts referring to the motives of people's aesthetic 
preferences have been employed more and more . Many of these concepts have 
been used for justifying the validity of aesthetic concerns. To cite a few examples, 
the New Jersey Supreme Court in State v. Miller (1980) stated that well designed 
developments 'contribute to psychological and emotional stability and well being 
as well as stimulate a sense of well being' (Karp, 1990, 381). In Oregon City v. 
Hartke (1965), the Oregon Supreme Court claimed: 'It is not irrational for those 
who live in a community . . . to plan their physical surroundings in such a way 
that unsightliness is minimized' (Karp, 1990, 381). And for a final example, in 
Metromedia v. City of San Diego (1981), the U. S. Supreme Court argued: 'Each 
[billboard] destroys a unique perspective on the landscape and adds to the visual 
pollution of the city' (Pearlman, 1988, 479). 
However, although the courts use these terms and concepts, the aesthetic con-
cerns are generally used with the secondary non-aesthetic justifications to uphold 
the aesthetic regulations. The reason is that secondary justifications are mostly 
easier to refer. For instance Williams (1977) argues: 
Although the harm inflicted is exclusively the result of popular reac-
tion to a form of expression, government's interest in protecting 
innocent parties against pecuniary loss seems more tolerable than an 
interest solely in protecting feelings (Williams, 1977,26). 
COLLECTIVE SENTIMENTS, AESTHETIC JUDGMENTS, AND THE 
PROBLEM OF HOW TO JUSTIFY THE VALIDITY OF AESTHETIC 
REGULATIONS 
One may ask: 'What is wrong with supporting primary aesthetic purposes with 
secondary, for instance, economic justifications? After all, an increase in the 
environment's attractiveness affects the overall property values in the long run'. This 
assertion is indeed open to debate, but let's assume that it is true for the moment. 
The first disadvantage of supporting aesthetic regulations with economic jus-
tification is that those aesthetic regulations which are totally independent from 
economic objectives will be ineffective. In other words, only those aesthetic 
regulations the rationale of which can be associated with economic concerns will 
be most likely to be upheld and others will be eliminated (Turnbull, 1971). The 
other disadvantage, in addition to the first one, is that upholding aesthetic 
regulations by means of secondary non-aesthetic concerns, Rowlett (1981) ar-
gues, obscures the primary purpose of the regulation, whereas 'ascertaining the 
primary purpose of a regulation is a necessary step in applying the well-recog-
nized test of the constitutionality of police power regulations' (Rowlett, 1981, 
51). Therefore, in many situations it is in essence unfair to justify aesthetic 
regulations based on non-aesthetic concerns. 
These problems bring the question of verification into the discussion. What kind of 
verification do courts need to refer in order to uphold aesthetic regulations? Do they 
need general standards for aesthetics which can be applied everywhere in every case? 
Do they have to verify the regulations, or can it possibly be verified on empirical 
bases that an aesthetic regulation is for public interest? 
At this point it is helpful to remember Durkheim's well known classification of 
legislation. He proposes two types: restitutory and repressive (penal) law. Res-
titutory law is based on the compensation of pecuniary losses between parties, 
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whereas the repressive (penal) law aims to satisfy the will of collective conscious, 
le., to satisfy the collective emotional reaction toward the guilt (Durkheim, 
1984). In a case of homicide, for instance, the motive in the punishment is not to 
compensate the loss, but simply to react against an infringement of the collective 
ethical values. The justification of a restitutory regulation is therefore different 
than the one of a repressive law. The economical or utilitarian justification 
works for the former, but not for the latter. A plausible definition of the collective 
values, i.e., the will of collective conscious, is necessary and also sufficient for the 
latter. Following this line of reasoning, it is fair to argue that the concept of public 
welfare and morality necessitates the latter type of justification, because the 
definition of the concept depends on the definition of the collective values of the 
time. 
There cannot be an empirical verification showing that an aesthetic regulation 
is for the public interest, but this does not make the aesthetic regulations 
non-testable in terms of their constitutionality. Reasonable, consistent, and fair 
description of the will of collective conscious, with a description employing value 
statements instead of verifiable empirical ones, can be sufficient. Williams (1977) 
reminds us that the aesthetic regulations are not the only ones having these 
characteristics, but there are many others for which the assertion that they are 
for the public interest cannot be empirically verified. Furthermore, interpreta-
tions of certain values or certain concepts like 'public welfare' by the courts can 
change in time. The courts can change their attitudes towards certain issues as 
the cultural and intellectual environment changes, as in the case of the changing 
attitudes towards death penalty, or towards the abortion rights. If the attitudes 
of the courts change in time, following the will of collective conscious, then 
empirical verification, even though it may facilitate argumentation, will lose its 
grounds. 
Aesthetic regulations are closely linked with collective sentiments and values. 
Consequently, it is fair to state that neither the utilitarian and economic justifica-
tions, nor empirical verification can provide an answer for the question of testing 
the constitutionality of aesthetic regulations. 
So, what can be done? I propose to turn our attention to another realm, namely 
the realm of aesthetic normative theories the where the aim is to define what 
aesthetics is, and to provide a framework for criticism by means of aesthetic 
judgment. Almost every normative theory of beauty provides different answers 
to the following questions: What makes something, an object, or an artifact, a 
musical or literary piece, a scenic view, or a wilderness area, beautiful? Or, what 
makes an experience an aesthetic experience, an act of admiring, being impressed 
emotionally, etc.? What is an aesthetic statement? What are the criteria for 
aesthetic evaluation? (Coleman, 1968). Aesthetic theories try to answer these 
questions in order to produce certain aesthetic judgments. These judgments 
provide a framework for aesthetic evaluation. 
For instance, a socialist, following the social realist movement in 1940s' Russia, 
would typically say that an artifact is beautiful and therefore provide apprecia-
tion, if it mirrors (or reflects) the material reality or class struggle of the society. 
The argument would further state that the real experience should depend on the 
real consciousness which is the consciousness of material reality. An expres-
sionist from the romantic period, on the other hand, would claim that artist's 
emotions are important, and those artists, who can express their unique emotions 
through art, produce great pieces to be appreciated. In other words, what is 
beautiful according to this view depends on the exceptional characteristics of the 
person who created it. A formist, however, would oppose this idea, by asserting that 
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what is beautiful is the inner structure of the work or the artifact. Therefore, the 
argument would proceed with the statement that exploring those characteristics 
of the object, which give it its inherent potential of being aesthetically appreci-
able, is a meaningful effort. 
By answering the questions in these ways, each approach also produces some 
value judgments, such as, 'art should reflect the material reality, and hence, 
should primarily be educational', or 'the artist should express her or his inner 
world in a poetic way that no other forms of expression can', or 'the artist should 
explore the universal structures which can be appreciated everywhere and should 
transfer those to the artifact he or she creates'. These judgments provide certain 
frameworks to evaluate aesthetic creation. Yet, how can we decide on a single 
framework? How can we know which framework is the best? 
These aesthetic judgments provide criteria for evaluation, but at the same time 
they also suggest arguments that explain the motives of our sentiments emerging 
from our aesthetic experiences. We find some explanations plausible and reject 
others. If we feel that these arguments refer to our experiences and they help us 
to understand some of our sentiments in a structured and verbalized way, then, 
we find them to have greater acceptance. 
Furthermore, these explanations can be partial, Le. some arguments may scrutinize 
certain experiences of ours, whereas others help us to understand some other 
experiences. There is nothing wrong, for instance, with the following line of reason-
ing: 'The socialist argument is weak in explaining why I enjoy listening to Bach. On 
one hand, the formist argument provides a much sounder explanation for my 
listening to Bach. But on the other hand, the socialist argument makes sense 
when Bertolucci's movie '1990' is concerned*. We can discuss the collective 
sentiments in the same way. For instance, we may argue that the socialist 
argument is weak in explaining why certain musical pieces are being appreciated 
by people of different cultures and from different social strata throughout the 
ages. On the other hand, the same approach can give a plausible explanation why 
a lot of people enjoyed watching the movie '1900'. Yet, neither of them can give 
a sound explanation why John Muir walked from Wisconsin to Louisiana, alone 
in wild nature, and still enjoyed this journey. So, we look for explanations and 
aesthetic judgments associated with different theories. 
Consequently, one criterion to assess aesthetic theories is whether or not associated 
aesthetic judgments are helpful in providing sound explanations to understand and 
verbalize collective sentiments of the day. Another important criterion, in our case, 
is whether or not these aesthetic judgments are compatible with the previously 
established higher level procedural rules and values of the courts. 
DIFFERENT AESTHETIC APPROACHES AND THEIR SIGNIFICANCE 
IN LEGAL AESTHETICS 
Having our basic expectations and the two criteria in mind, Le., usefulness in 
explanation and the courts' compatibility, we may now discuss the aesthetic 
theories of environmental conservation and design. As mentioned in the intro-
duction, four distinct approaches are to be reviewed and compared here. These 
are (a) the subjective approach, (b) the objective approach which sees nature as 
a beautiful object, (c) the objective approach which sees the experience in nature 
as uplifting, educating and aesthetic, and finally (d) the inter-subjective approach 
which defines the beauty referring to the symbolic meanings and values attached 
to the object or to the environment. 
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The subjectivist approach claims that the environmental aesthetics is a matter of 
taste and it is the individual's choice and background which determines how one 
approaches to the environment. This approach was adopted by the courts espe-
cially in the pre-Berman period, and courts, referring to this approach, claimed 
that aesthetic purposes alone cannot provide a valid basis for government's use 
of police power. 
The objectivist approach, which sees nature as an object of beauty, argues that 
every human being can appreciate nature's scenic beauties and panoramas. There 
is an inherent characteristic in those scenic vistas and panoramas, and because 
of that these places can be appreciated by everyone. This approach has been 
adopted especially in governmental policies for the management of public lands, 
i.e. National Parks, National Forests, Shores, and so on. 
The objectivist natural aesthetics approach emphasizes the experience. It argues 
that if one can grasp the ecological relations hidden behind its surface beauty, 
the experience in nature can be uplifting, educating and aesthetically pleasing. 
This approach has been advocated by growing number of environmentalists, who 
propose a biocentric ethical basis for land use planning. 
Finally, the inter-subjective approach claims that there are some shared bases 
for people's aesthetic experiences. The collective meanings associated with the 
environment condition people's attachment to their surroundings and facilitate 
their ability to identify themselves with their environments. Therefore, their 
aesthetic experiences in those environments cannot be independent from those 
meanings and attachments. This approach has been recognized by the courts and, 
one way or other, has been referred in many design reviews, and zoning and 
historical landmark cases. 
Before getting into detailed discussion of each approach, it is helpful to spend a 
little time about the objectivist and subjectivist views of aesthetics. The objec-
tivist view claims that there exists an aesthetic value embodied by the object, 
which is independent from people's attitudes. That is to say, the aesthetic value 
of a musical piece, or a painting, or an architectural work, exists independent of 
people listening to that musical piece, or viewing the painting, or living in that 
architecture. 
Coleman (1968), being an advocate of this view, gives the example of a complex 
musical piece, let's say, a symphony by Brahms. He claims that a child cannot 
understand this music, because he or she is to be educated both emotionally and 
technically in order to follow the music. But the fact that this child cannot follow 
the music is irrelevant in evaluating the aesthetic value of that musical piece; the 
value is still there waiting to be appreciated. Similarly, if a lot of people ap-
preciate viewing a natural scenery, we can say that there is an aesthetic value 
inherent in that scenery. The fact that some other people do not find that scenery 
exceptional or beautiful does not detract from its aesthetic value. 
The subjectivist view, on the other hand, does not accept the existence of an 
aesthetic value which is independent from peoples' emotions and sentiments. 
This view claims that if there is no psychological impulse such as an emotion, a 
pleasure, or something similar, then there is no aesthetic value. In other words, 
one cannot talk about an aesthetic value without referring to people's interests, 
and expectations. After all, people may have different interests and they may 
approach the same object with different expectations. Let us think about a 
building, say, a house. An engineer, with the structural problems in mind, would 
see it as a structural problem. On the other hand, it is natural for, let's say, its 
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future users who have some utilitarian questions in mind, to see the house like 
a tool they are going to use. Finally, an architectural critic who has just finished 
a paper on styles, most probably would approach the house as if it were a 
sculpture in which one could walk around. Furthermore, it is true for every one 
of us that we sometimes play the role of engineer, sometimes of the user, and still 
at other times that of the critic. 
The subjectivist view argues that there are no distinct categories to differentiate 
objects of beauty and other objects. If we are playing the role of critics at the 
moment, even the very profane tools in the house, a faucet, or a hammer can 
activate our emotions. The trees, the cities, the streets can become works of art 
to the degree we are able to experience them aesthetically. On the other hand, 
for an appraiser who is trying to predict the original date of a painting, even a 
painting in the museum can be seen as an accumulation of paints with different 
chemicals. Consequently, for the subjectivist view, there are different types of 
experiences instead of different types of objects, and the aesthetic experience is 
one form of experience among many others. 
THE SUBJECTIVIST VIEW 
The subjectivist view of aesthetics was the common view recognized by the courts 
in the pre-Berman period. The following quote from Colorado Supreme Court's 
statement in Curran Bill Posting and Distribution Co. v. City of Denver (1910) 
demonstrates a typical earlier attitude of the courts toward the aesthetic issues: 
The cut of the dress, the color of the garment worn, the style of the 
hat, the architecture of the building or its color, may be distasteful to 
the refined senses of some, yet government can neither control nor 
regulate in such affairs (47 Colo. 1910; Costonis, 1988, 21). 
The subjectivist view, in essence, implies an extreme relativism of tastes and 
suggests no support for aesthetic regulations. If there is no aesthetic value 
inherently embodied by the objects, and if the aesthetic experience is seen as a 
specific form of pleasure giving emotional experience, then, one object may be 
pleasing for one and not pleasing for others. Aesthetic preference becomes a 
matter of individual's taste. In other words, if there is no value embodied in the 
object, nobody has the right to argue that any specific object is worth preserving, 
because it will give an aesthetic pleasure to others, in the future. Hence, there 
can be no aesthetic reason to preserve an object or the environment. 
According to the editor of the Michigan Law Review (1973, 1442), there are 
primarily two assumptions that the courts have employed following the subjec-
tive view: 'First, that there can be no consensus in matters of aesthetics. Second, 
that no aesthetic judgment is more or less reasonable than any other. . \ The 
second assumption especially stands against justifying any aesthetic regulation 
for legitimate use of police power to secure public interest. 
The subjectivist claims lost their strength continuously, as the intellectual en-
vironment shifted from individualism of the 1920's, towards the New Deal 
Federalism's collective spirit (Costonis, 1988). During the 1930's and the 1940's, 
the courts began to recognize the aesthetic claims as significant concerns, but 
used them as secondary justifications along with non-aesthetic concerns (Karp, 
1990). Especially, after the Berman case, the majority of courts left the subjec-
tivist view and, as already mentioned, recognized the aesthetic concerns alone to 
uphold aesthetic regulations. However, there are still some courts following the 
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subjectivist claims and some scholars critiquing the increasing number of aes-
thetic regulations (e.g., Lightner, 1992; Pouler, 1992). Pouler (1992), for instance, 
attacks aesthetic regulations claiming that they are killing the variety, encourag-
ing a socially and physically homogenous surrounding, and oppressing the 
plurality. Lightner (1992), following the subjectivist view, argues that even when 
there is a consensus on aesthetic taste in a community, the majority has no right 
to suppress the minority's taste. If we follow the subjectivist view, the argument 
makes sense. After all, the courts do not suppress the minority party's freedom 
of speech, because the majority has voted for the other party. So, why for instance, 
a review board prohibits certain types of architecture in certain districts? 
Consequently, if we define the motive behind the consensus as a matter of 
personal taste, the consensus loses its grounds to be presented as for the public 
interest. Let us think about the following example. Say, there is a highway to be 
built between two major cities. Although there may be some minorities who will 
never use this highway, and although there are some private properties who are 
going to be condemned, it is very easy for the courts to recognize that the highway 
is for the public interest. They do not ask the majority's opinion for each case; it 
is obvious for almost everybody that the highway will provide rapid and easier 
means of transportation, will improve business, and so on. 
In other words, there is a sound argument to accept that the implementation of 
the highway is for the public interest. Let's say, there is a strong opposition in 
the community against the highway. Following the same line of reasoning, we 
may say that what is important here is not the question of whether or not the 
opposition represents the majority's opinion, but it is how reasonable the 
argument behind the opposition is to represent it as a public interest. Let's say, 
the argument is a strong economic one. We may say that most probably the courts 
will uphold any regulation prohibiting the construction of that highway on the 
basis of the opposition. By the same token, if the opposition emerges as an 
aesthetic reaction, in other words, if it is activated by the collective sentiments, 
then, these sentiments should be represented in the courts with an argument 
stronger than the 'individuals' personal tastes', according to the claims of the 
subjectivist view. 
To conclude, it can be asserted that the subjective view is far from providing 
sound explanations for the motives of collective sentiments. It is essentially 
against the governmental involvement in aesthetic regulations. 
OBJECTIVIST VIEW 
The objectivist view, on the other hand, provides a stable rationale for preserva-
tion, by means of its assumption that the aesthetic value is an inherent property 
of the object of beauty. However, I am going to claim that, in the legal realm, this 
view creates certain problems in terms of its compatibility with the courts' higher 
level procedural rules and values, especially those related with fairness and 
equity. 
Although sometimes one can find some objectivist claims in the design review 
guidelines or historical landmark cases, it is especially in the field of nature 
preservation that objectivist aesthetic view has been extensively referred by the 
courts. Therefore, I am going to review two primary nature preservation ap-
proaches which are based on objectivist view of aesthetics. 
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NATURE AS THE OBJECT OF BEAUTY 
The idea of natural scenes and panoramas which are able to 'take the breath of 
every human being away' has been a very common theme guiding many nature 
preservation activities, since the earliest conservation movements. Since the 
establishment of earlier State Parks and later the National Parks, the aesthetic 
concerns were one of the foreground purposes, especially for the group called 
nature preservationists (Koppes, 1987). The mentioned aesthetic concerns were 
essentially objectivist concerns. It was believed that nature inhabits a sublime 
value within itself. This value is out there waiting to be appreciated. This value 
is like a resource. Indeed, it is nonrenewable. Once it is gone, the next generations 
will lose the chance to enjoy and appreciate it. 
It is important to note that in those earlier years of nature preservation, the 
opposition which exists today between visual resource management and the 
advocates of deepest nature experience did not exist. The concept of the sublime 
value of nature implied both a picturesque aesthetic value and also an uplifting, 
educating and emotionally activating, I would say, aesthetic plus moral value. 
Leaving the latter side of this opposition to the next section, I want to concentrate 
here on visual resource management. 
The picturesque aesthetic value of nature is seen as a resource to be preserved 
by agencies like National Park Service and Natural Forest Service and attracted 
many researchers to establish certain aesthetic standards which are to be used in 
designating scenery and areas worth preserving. The nature of those standards is 
a significant issue for us. 
In the previous section it was discussed that for subjectivists consensus is meaning-
less. For objectivists it is the contrary. If there is an aesthetic value embodied by an 
object, say a scenery, the existence of a significant amount of people enjoying that 
scenery can be a good clue in fixing the existence and defining the ingredients of that 
value. The researcher facilitates this by asking which characteristics of the sceneries 
are being appreciated, and therefore, are those to be appreciated. 
Linton's (1968) study of landscape assessment where he established the charac-
teristics of relative relief, wildness, desolateness, untouchedness as the major 
criteria, Fines' (1968) study where he categorized and mapped 773 square-mile 
area of East Sussex in unsightly, spectacular, superb, etc. zones, and Steinitz' 
(1990) visual preference studies are few examples among many other similar 
l. Both Linton's and Fine's works have aesthetic assessment studies which follow the objectivist view (1). Each of these 
been published again in Brooks and studies provides certain landscape characteristics as aesthetic standards which 
Lavigne (1985) facilitate management guidelines for governmental agencies to follow. 
When an aesthetic value is said to belong to an object, following the objectivist 
view, this value becomes everlasting as long as the object exists. Therefore, once 
certain aesthetic standards are established with the presumption that these 
standards represent the universal characteristics of the mentioned everlasting 
aesthetic value, one no longer needs to change these standards. For instance, if 
Fines' East Essex map is able to designate the natural areas having aesthetic 
values, and if his criteria are to depict those characteristics of the landscape which 
give it the mentioned aesthetic value, then the governmental agencies have the 
right to preserve those characteristics till eternity. In the objectivist approach, 
there remains no need for change; the aesthetic value is over there and preserved. 
The established standards can be legalized and coerced by police power. Even if 
there appear new majorities with new preferences, there is no chance in the 
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mentioned process to employ the new inputs. Once the standards are established, 
they are valid everywhere and anytime. 
When it is employed by governmental agencies, or by the courts upholding 
regulations, this resistance against change and the dependence on experts estab-
lishing the standards make the objectivist aesthetic view overly conservative, 
elitist, and remote from changing collective sentiments. These aspects of stand-
ards remind us of Lightner's (1992) and Pouler's (1992) cry for dynamism, 
plurality, and variety. Pouler, for instance, argues: 
Aesthetic decision making is ultimately not founded upon objective 
or mutual standards of judgment, nor in consensus, but simply reverts 
back to those in control, the same forces that determine much of the 
public realm; the political, capitalist, cultural elite (Pouler, 1992,223). 
Similarly, Costonis (1982) attacks the elitism of the objectivist view. He claims 
that establishing and coercing objective standards of beauty implies a despotism. 
This despotism is incompatible with courts' concerns about equal protection and 
their way of securing the public interests. I want to close this section with a quote 
by Costonis, which summarizes this argument of incompatibility: 
The visual beauty rationale's search for standards, defined as objective 
canons of aesthetic formalism, is both unnecessary and futile. . . 
Standards of aesthetic formalism cannot be authoritatively rendered 
as objective, ontologically based 'laws' (Costonis, 1982,424-425). 
NATURE AS THE REALM OF UPLIFTING, EDUCATING, AND AES-
THETIC EXPERIENCE 
Aldo Leopold, inA Sand County Almanac, states: 
A thing is right when it tends to preserve the integrity, stability, and 
beauty of the biotic community. It is wrong when it tends otherwise 
(Leopold, 1949). 
This quote says many things: First, in the same line with the subjectivist view, it 
suggests that there is an aesthetic value in nature waiting to be appreciated. 
Second, this aesthetic value is not independent from the integrity and stability of 
the biotic community. Finally, and most important, the appreciation of this 
aesthetic value cannot be independent from ethical attitudes, in other words, one 
should first be respectful towards the integrity and stability of the biotic com-
munity; only after, he or she can appreciate the aesthetic value inherent in nature. 
This approach defines the aesthetic experience within a specific ethical paradigm. 
In other words, instead of using standards to define the characteristics of the 
aesthetic value existing inherently in nature, this approach suggests some ethical 
principles guaranteeing the appreciation of its value. 
Honestly, I hesitate discussing this approach in this section. There can be two 
different interpretations of this approach. The first one says that (e.g., Ka'rp, 
1989), if the mentioned ethical principles represent the collective will of the 
communities, then it is the Congress' job to amend acts such as Wilderness Act 
of 1964, or Endangered Species Act of 1973, and it is the courts' job to uphold 
related regulations and enlarge the definition of public interest, claiming that 
respect for biodiversity is for the public interest. Indeed, the mentioned ethical 
principles have underlined the history of conservation in United States since the 
very early times of the movement. As I will discuss in the next section, this 
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interpretation iş essentially inter-subjective, because it recognizes that the men­
tioned ethical principles had originated culturally, and are sustained by means 
of the support of the people of this country. 
The other interpretation, which is closer to the objectivist view, claims that the 
mentioned ethical principles are indeed necessary procedures to appreciate the 
nature's beauty. In other words, if there is an aesthetic value out there, and if we 
know that the appreciation of it depends on some principles and procedures, 
then, the preservation of that value means the protection of the procedures and 
coercion of the principles. 
CaUicott (1992), for instance, argues that the real aesthetic experience in nature 
is possible only with the real understanding of how nature works. Along this line, 
the ecological knowledge can significantly support a person in developing an 
ability to appreciate nature. But, this knowledge, as Collicott (1992) claims, 
should be supported with the real experiences and real observations in nature. 
The ecological knowledge can be a tool for someone to see what cannot be seen 
at first look. The aesthetic value existing in nature is the representation of the perfect 
creation. According to CaUicott (1992), by even watching an ant, one can grasp the 
insights of ant's life and appreciate this value of nature's beauty and perfection. 
Furthermore, if one is able to appreciate watching an ant, then by even watching an 
ant, that person can educate him-or-herself ethically and emotionally. 
This approach can be seen as a recent version of the Platonic philosophy. Plato 
suggests that the things around us are images that we perceive, and arc the repre­
sentations of some 'idea' which are perfection of God. One can reach and grasp that 
'idea' by going behind the realm of visions and understanding the essential 
interrelations among the things in nature. According to Plato, art mirrors the 
surface appearances we perceive, in other words, it is the copy of a copy. Hence, 
art puts distance between us and the world of 'idea'. A picture of an ant can show 
only the surface image that we can perceive at first look anyway. 
Similarly, Sax (1980) argues that the aesthetic appreciation of nature is totally 
different from driving through a scenic road and looking for spots to take 
pictures. Wood (1988) goes one step further and critiques the scenic manage­
ment and argues that scenic management policies lie to us about nature and 
obscure its deep relations. In a similar line of Plato's anti-art philosophy, this 
approach encourages an anti-culture stance and sees the famous 'scenic beauty' 
images, i.e., vistas and panoramas that popular culture favors, as artificial and 
superficial. Collicott (1992) emphasizes the differences between artifactual and 
natural aesthetics and argues that nature can provide us an educating and 
emotionally uplifting experience that no artifact or art piece can provide. 
This approach is a forceful approach in preparing some experience oriented 
management programs in parks and wilderness areas (2). But it underemphasizes 
the significance of the collective sentiments of popular culture. Furthermore, it 
does not recognize the symbolic meanings of certain experiences in scenic areas 
and unique vista points. Taking a picture of a Grand Canyon view from exactly 
where thousands of other Americans have taken the same picture is a worthless 
activity, according to this view. What this view fails to see though, is that the view 
in Grand Canyon has been preserved for decades, just because every year 
thousands of people take pictures from that very viewpoint and put those pictures 
proudly in albums or on their walls. In other words, taking pictures of that vista 
becomes a kind of cultural ritual, and therefore, it represents a significant 
2. See the proposed policy improvements concern, preservation of which can be justified as for the public interest in the 
for National Parks by Sax (1980). , 
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INTER-SUBJECTIVIST VIEW 
This view starts with the basic subjectivist assumption that there can be no 
aesthetic value inherent in objects, which is independent from people's emotions 
and sentiments. Yet it differs from the subjectivist view by asserting that people 
indeed can attach certain aesthetic values, along with some non-aesthetic ones, 
to certain objects through a symbolism that they construct and through identify-
ing themselves with those objects. Therefore, there is reason to preserve those 
objects as long as the mentioned attachments are made. Furthermore, these 
attachments can be collectively constructed. 
Any kind of object, like buildings, plazas, scenic views, valleys, and mountains, 
can symbolize certain values and can reveal certain attachments for people. In 
that case the infringement of such visual, spatial or experiential structures means 
the destruction of values, and identities as perceived by the latter. Costonis 
(1988), one of the major supporters of this view, calls these objects as icons. He 
claims that the destruction of icons by means of new developments (he calls them 
aliens) means the destruction of what those icons symbolize. The Statue of 
Liberty in New York, the White House in Washington D. G, the Grand Canyon 
in Arizona are examples embodying strong national attachments. They represent 
high degree of sensitivity at national scale, in other words, the destruction of 
those may create strong nationwide emotional reactions. 
Appleyard (1979) argues that beyond their specific symbolic meanings, icons may 
embody some other and deeper attachments; people may identify themselves 
with those icons. In other words, the destruction of those icons can threaten the 
psychological security of those who see the surrounding icons as part of themselves. 
The intersubjective view, with its 'attached values' argument provides a flexible 
reasoning in scrutinizing responses of collective sentiments in different issues, 
such as historical preservation, design review, and environmental protection. As 
it is mentioned in the previous section, the ethical environmental principles, for 
instance having respect for biodiversity, can be seen as culturally developed 
attitudes. They can be interpreted as the reflections of collective values and 
sentiments. In this sense, the justification of many nature preservation regula-
tions, which are based on the argument that they reflect the will of the collective 
conscious, is compatible with the inter-subjective approach. 
Following a similar line of reasoning, Stiles (1975) argues that the argument of 
'attached values' has underlined the primary assumptions of historical preserva-
tion since its earlier days. Pyke (1971) claims that courts generally employ the 
cultural emphasis in the definition of 'special historical or aesthetic value'. 
Because of attachments such as truthfulness, morality, memory, and stability, 
Merryman (1989) argues that the preservation of cultural icons is for the public 
interest. 
Other than historical landmark cases, the inter-subjective approach has been 
increasingly employed by the courts in design review cases. Costonis (1988) 
points out that the argument of 'emotional and cultural stability' is a suitable 
issue that the courts have increasingly employed in problematic design review 
cases. In Reid v. Architectural Board of Review (1963) where Ohio Appeals 
Court upheld Cleveland Heights' (a suburb of Cleveland) Architectural Board 
of Review's decision denying Mrs. Reid's application for building a modernist 
one story house in a neighborhood of two storey residential buildings, the court 
claimed that the house 'does not conform to the character of the houses in the 
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area' (119 Ohio App., Williams, 1977,3). Although this decision has been found 
discriminatory (Turnbull, 1971) and problematic by some (Turnbull, 1971; Wil-
liams, 1977), 'the attached values' argument helps us to understand that this and 
similar decisions may have valid justifications. 
The decision seems unfair from an individualist point of view. Yet if we can see 
the whole environment as a single artifact with attached collective values, then 
the construction of that house in that neighborhood can be seen like putting a 
'nonconforming' handrail to a house. Here, the icon is the whole neighborhood. 
If we think about building a glass walled high-rise office building in the middle of 
French Quarter of New Orleans, 'the historical associations and values of single 
buildings' would not be enough to explain the emotional collective reaction which 
would probably appear. 'Symbolic and identity related attachments of whole district' 
would be a more reasonable argument to represent the collective reaction in the 
courts, as a valid public interest to prevent the construction of the building. 
This whole argument may seem to promote conservatism. Yet, it does not have 
to. As long as the speed of change is kept at a reasonable rate, and the changes 
do not distract the icons, the surroundings can be developed without a serious 
negative aesthetic impact. The issue is to what degree the new elements have the 
potential to become the bases of new attachments, to what degree people are 
ready to accept differences and changes, and how willing people are to attach 
new meanings to the new elements. 
In this sense, what inter-subjectivist view is actually advocating is a dynamic 
process, literally a 'design review' process, instead of a 'preservation' based on 
standards. If there is a tolerable degree of change and if the collective sentiments 
defining that level are also subject to change, then, protection cannot be a process 
dependent upon stable standards. Preservation of icons necessitates a process of 
continuous reinterpretation of attachments and of continuous effort for repre-
senting the changing collective sentiments in the courts. 
After all, a development or a project, which is seen as an alien today, can be 
tolerated tomorrow, and vice versa. I think it is fair to close this section with the 
following argument. It is this dynamism and flexibility to scrutinize collective 
sentiments in different cases which makes the inter-subjective approach and 'the 
attachment of values' argument particularly suitable for the courts in justifying 
the validity of aesthetic regulations as significant public purposes. 
CONCLUSION 
I started the discussion with an historical review suggesting that during the 
history of aesthetic regulations the number of the regulations has increased, the 
collective will to preserve certain environments has grown, and the courts' 
definition of public welfare has been broadened. 
However, we have seen that many courts justify constitutionality of aesthetic 
regulations by employing non-aesthetic concerns such as property values and 
public safety. Furthermore, sometimes courts try to justify aesthetic regulations 
by means of empirical verifications. It is argued that these forms of justification 
are problematic and unfair. The aesthetic regulations are motivated by some 
collective sentiments or emotions, and therefore, they should be validated only 
by a plausible explanation of the motives of mentioned collective sentiments. 
Thus, the aesthetic judgments used in normative aesthetic theories can be 
important sources for legitimation of aesthetic theories. 
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Following this line of reasoning, I tried to make a comparative review of different 
approaches. These approaches are the subjective approach, the objective ap­
proach which sees nature as an object of beauty, the objective approach which 
sees the experience in nature as uplifting, educating, and aesthetically pleasing, 
and finally the inter-subjective approach which defines the aesthetic experience 
referring to the symbolic meanings and values attached to the environment and 
peoples' ability to identify themselves with their surroundings. 
I classified these approaches within the framework of the well known opposition 
of objectivist and subjectivisl aesthetic views. I assessed these approaches based 
on two criteria: how well the aesthetic judgments of these approaches scrutinize 
the motives of collective sentiments and whether or not the approaches are 
compatible with the higher procedural values of the courts. 
The subjeetivist view rejects the existence of an aesthetic value inherently existing 
within the object, and therefore, it is essentially against the governmental invol­
vement in aesthetic regulations. Furthermore, it defines the motive behind the 
aesthetic consensus as a matter of personal taste, thus even if it exists, the 
consensus loses its grounds to be presented as public interest. Therefore, the 
subjeetivist view is far from providing sound explanation for the motives of 
collective sentiments. 
The objectivist view, on the other hand, claims the existence of an aesthetic value 
inherent İn the object, waiting over there, to be appreciated. The consensus is 
significant in determining the characteristics or the ingredients of that aesthetic 
value. But, this line of reasoning suggests that once this aesthetic value, e.g., the 
beauty in nature, is determined and defined, then the established standards are 
sufficient to preserve them; there is no need for change. The aesthetic value, 
which is no different than any other resource, exists over there, and it is preserved 
as long as the area is preserved. Although this view provides a strong base for 
preservation, the elitism employed in the establishment of standards and the 
despotism employed in coercing them are incompatible with the courts' higher 
level procedural rules and values. 
Finally, the inter-subjectivist view rejects the existence of an aesthetic value 
which is independent from people's emotions and sentiments. It further proposes 
that people can attach certain aesthetic values, with non-aesthetic ones, to 
certain objects through symbolism or through identifying themselves with those 
objects. These attachments can change in lime. Therefore, they should be 
redefined continuously. In this sense this view encourages a dynamic 'design 
review' process instead of 'preserving' objects according to aesthetic standards. 
This dynamism and flexibility of the 'attached values' argument makes the 
inter-subjectivist approach particularly suitable for the courts in representing 
collective sentiments in different aesthetic matters and in justifying the con­
stitutionality of different aesthetic regulations. 
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TOPLUMCA BEĞENİLENİ KORUMAK: 
ESTETİK YAKLAŞIMLAR VE BU YAKLAŞIMLARIN YASAL 
ÇERÇEVEDEKİ ÖNEMLERİ 
ÖZET 
Alındı : 4. 11. 1996 
Analılar Sözcükler: Hsletik, Çevre Kslcliği, 
Toplumsal Yargı, Çevre Hukuku, Toplum­
sal Yargı, Nesnellik-Öznellik, U/.laşımsal 
Öznellik. 
Amerika Birleşik Devletlerinde çevrenin estetiğine ilişkin yasal çerçevenin 
yakın tarihini gözden geçirdiğimizde, farklı gelişmeler göze çarpmaktadır. Es­
tetik nedenlerin öne sürüldüğü koruma yasaları hem sayısal olarak artmış, hem 
de içerikleri karmaşıklaşmıştır. Çevrenin korunmasını isteyen toplumsal irade 
güç kazanmakta ve kendini daha geniş tabanlarda dile getirmektedir. Ayrıca 
mahkemelerin kullandığı 'kamu yararı' kavramı genişletilmektedir. Özellikle 
1956 yılında yer alan Berman-Parkcr duruşmasından sonra 'estetik kaygı'nın, 
yönetimlerin özel mülk üstündeki yapılaşmaların kısıtlanmasında, tek başına 
yeterli bir dayanak olduğu görüşü çok sayıda yargıç tarafından benimsenmiştir. 
Öte yandan, estetikle ilgili söz konusu yasa ve yönetmeliklerin anayasallığı 
sorgulandığında, 1956 yılından sonra bile, yargıçların bu yönetmelikleri kamu 
güvenliği ya da mali gereklilik gibi ikincil nedenlere başvurarak savunabildik-
lerini izliyoruz. Bazı duruşmalarda, yönetmeliklerde yer alan estetikle ilgili 
kuralların görgül doğruluklarının bile ispatlanmaya çalışıldığını, bunun için de 
bazen bilirkişilere danışıldığını izlemekteyiz. 
Gerek estetik kuralların ikincil bazı başka kaygılara dayanılarak savunul­
masında, gerekse de bu kuralların doğruluklarının ispatlanmaya çalışılmasında 
sorunlar ve adaletsizlikler bulunduğu öne sürülcbilmektedir. Estetikle ilgili 
koruma yasaları, toplu olarak hissedilen bazı duyguların sonucunda doğmuştur. 
Bu kurallar ancak söz konusu duyguların sağ duyuya aykırı olmayacak bir biçimde 
dile getirilmesiyle ve tartışılabilmesiyle savunulabilir ve bu kurallar ancak bu 
yolla yasal dayanaklar elde edebilir. Bu çerçevede, çevrenin estetiğine ilişkin bazı 
kuramların gözden geçirilmesi mahkeme salonlarında estetikle ilgili yasaların 
makul bir biçimde nasıl savunulabileceği konusundaki tartışmaya ışık tutacaktır. 
Burada çeşitli estetik yaklaşımları tartışılmakta, karşılaştırılmakta ve mah­
kemelerde estetik değer yargılarının kullanımını artırmayı amaçlayan bir çerçeve 
açısından bu yaklaşımlar değerlendirilmektedir. Değerlendirmede başlıca iki 
ölçüt kullanılmıştır: (a) Söz konusu yaklaşımın öne sürdüğü estetik değer 
yargıları, çevrelerin korunması konusunda topluca hissedilen kaygıların ve 
duyguların dile getirilmesinde ne kadar yardımcı olabiliyor? (b) Bu yaklaşımların 
öne sürdüğü koruma çerçeveleri anayasallık açısından (eşit muamele, tahmin 
edilebilir ya da beklenilir muamele ve ifade özgürlükleri açılarından) ne kadar 
tutarlıdır? 
Günümüzde çevresel estetik konusunda akademik çevrelerde yaygın olan ve aynı 
zamanda yönetimlerin çeşitli birimleri tarafından kullanılan koruma 
kurallarında dört farklı estetik yaklaşımı gözlenmektedir. Bunlar: (1) estetiği 
öznel bir deneyim olarak gören 'öznel yaklaşım', (2) doğayı mutlak bir güzellik 
unsuru olarak gören nesnel yaklaşım, (2) doğadaki deneyimi öğretici, yükseltici 
ve geliştirici bir deneyim olarak gören nesnel yaklaşım, (3) estetik deneyimi 
çevreyle özdeşleşme ve çevreye topluluklarca atfedilen sembolik ve mecazi 
değerler açısından tanımlayan 'uzlaşmacı öznel yaklaşım'dır. Bu dört yaklaşımın 
tarih içindeki gelişimleri de farklılıklar göstermektedir. 
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Estetik deneyimin kişisel birikimlerle ilişkili olduğunu ve kamu yararı 
kavramının böylesi göreli bir ortamda tanımlanamayacağını öne süren öznel 
yaklaşım, koruma yasaları için her hangi bir savunu sunamamaktadır. Nesnel 
yaklaşımlar ise estetik değeri, nesneye (ya da çevreye) ait bir doğal kaynak olarak 
görmekte ve sunduğu yasal çerçeve devinim içinde olan planlama ve tasarım 
etkinlikleriyle uzlaşamamaktadır. Ayrıca bu yaklaşıma dayanan koruma kuralları 
teknokratik bir biçimde tepeden inme uygulandığından ve topluca hissedilen 
duygulan dışladığından dolayı çoğunlukla anayasallıkları açısından sorunlu 
bulunmaktadır. Bu açıdan 'uzlaşmacı öznel yaklaşım'm, sembolik ve mecazi 
değerleri ve toplulukların kendini çeşitli çevrelerle özdeşleştirme süreçlerini en 
iyi dile getirdiği için, yasal çerçeve açısından en verimli ve yararlı yaklaşım olduğu 
sonucuna varılmaktadır. 
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